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of the Augustinians ; a system to which we are indebted for whatever is best in Augustine and Aquinas, and which, whatever may have been its errors, was in such fundamental correspondence with the facts of nature and of man that its formulæ are to-day found to be the most suitable embodiment of the religion of science.

If we find the philosophic insight of the Alexandrians too much alloyed with an unacceptable mysticism, it is not to Augustinianism, which dissolves philosophy in a far less noble if less thaumaturgic mysticism, that we should turn, but rather to the sober criticism of the Antiochian school. But the nominalism in which the latter abuts has consequences more fantastic than even the mysteriosophy of Neo-Platonism.

It is to be regretted that so important a work should not have been edited with more care. Not only are there instances of untranslated references, mistranslations, and flagrant Teutonisms, but occasionally proper names and titles of books which have an accepted English form are allowed to remain in one that is wholly strange to the English reader. Another defect is the absence of an index or of chronological notes. As the arrangement of the matter is necessarily far from being chronological it is not easy to find passages sought for. But in spite of these superficial imperfections, the scholarly portion of the American public cannot be too grateful to Professor Mitchell for placing before it this invaluable and almost epoch-making work.

MERWIN-MARIE SNELL.

DARWIN AND HEGEL. With Other Philosophical Studies. By *David G. Ritchie*, M. A. London : Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York : Macmillan & Co. 1893.

The reader of the philosophical periodicals is already well acquainted with the essays of Mr. Ritchie here collected. Nine in number, they appeared in *Mind*, *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *The Philosophical Review*, etc. Their titles are : "Origin and Validity" ; "Darwin and Hegel" ; "What is Reality ?" ; "On Plato's Phædo" ; "What are Economic Laws ?" ; "Locke's Theory of Property" ; "Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory" ; "On the Conception of Sovereignty" ; and "The Rights of Minorities." Though apparently isolated discussions of philosophical and other topics, selected at random, they are yet presented under a common point of view and form a coherent set of illustrations of Mr. Ritchie's philosophy, which subsequently, perhaps, will be more fully developed. The title of the book is that of the second essay, "Darwin and Hegel" ; because this antithesis best emphasises Mr. Ritchie's point of view—an attempted reconciliation of the idealist principles of Hegel, as based on Kantian criticism, and the evolutionary theory of Darwin, as it is now generally expressed in the so-called "historical" method of studying ideas and institutions. This point of view is well sketched in the opening essay "Origin and Validity," where Mr. Ritchie analyses the contents of knowledge, places the true emphasis on the Kantian doctrine of the *a priori*, defines the limits of metaphysics, and shows us the important difference

which exists between an historical and a philosophical analysis of ideas and institutions.

This last distinction is the key-note of the book. We have not solved the problem of a thing or an idea when we have shown how it has come about (i. e., disclosed its origin, its material cause, Aristotle's *ἐξ οὗ*). There still remains the important task of critically studying and testing its validity, its function, aim, or purpose (*τέλος*), the complete state *as it now exists*, which is the task of philosophy or of metaphysics (in its good sense). Metaphysics, or the study of the conditions which make knowledge, conduct, and nature possible, cannot be dispensed with. The recognition of this is Kant's immortal merit. Without the so-called *a priori* elements of cognition, science is impossible; and what is called *a priori* in the theory of knowledge has its formal correspondents in the "ideals" of logic, ethics, and æsthetics. In the theory of knowledge, the elements which are not dependent upon sense-experience for their validity are usually termed "categories," and are such as "identity," "cause," "time," "space," and so forth. These notions are not intuitive, not innate, not mystical; they are not without a psychological history; neither are they limited in number; but—and this is the point of importance—without them, knowledge, conduct, nature, are impossible, and *this is what is meant by a priori*.

Philosophies all now tend to recognise this distinction of the *a priori*, properly understood, from the sensational element. Only within this domain, when once established, as an instance from Mr. Ritchie's own realm of ideas well illustrates, there is much room for differences that wholly outweigh the agreements of the individual philosophies in the acceptance of the distinction. Take, for instance, Mr. Ritchie's category of "self-consciousness." Following Professor Green Mr. Ritchie says, that to make knowledge possible there must be "a comparing and distinguishing Self." It matters not that this Self has a psychological history; to render it *a priori* it is sufficient that it is a *necessary presupposition* of knowledge. But since time "though relatively a form, may also be a content of knowledge, this self must be independent of time; I know I am a series of experiences in time, therefore in some way I am not in time—but an eternal (that is, timeless) self-consciousness." Further, "that there is an eternal self-consciousness we are logically compelled to believe, and that it is in *some way* present in our individual selves; but in *what way* is a matter of speculation." Again, "and it is still quite competent, to any one who accepts the main result of the critical examination of knowledge, to maintain that this latter problem is altogether insoluble; although it is a problem which we cannot leave alone because we are met by it at every step in our ordinary experience."

Call time, space, substance, cause, what we will, all must agree that these notions or categories are abstractions of fundamental features of existence; they express the connexions, the interdependences of existence. If a thing exists, it must partake of the nature of existence. It must be in some way connected with the universe or with reality, so that it can affect it; and it can only affect it through the means, connexions, or activities which we have formulated as time, space, cause,

motion, and so forth. Consequently, anything which is beyond, above, without, or independent of, the criteria of existence, cannot exist; as must certainly be the case with Mr. Ritchie's idea of Self, if it is independent of everything. To say that "Self" is a presupposition of knowledge is no more true than to say that the *worla* is a presupposition of knowledge, and that (by the same process of reasoning) this also is independent of time, etc., etc., that is, of itself. But this may not be the Idealist's view. At any rate the psychological analysis of the soul can teach us one thing: that the notion of Self is a very complex notion, and that if we place it on the same level with "cause," "time," and so forth, we shall be able to derive from it whatever we want. The idea, as a "category," seems to be an anthropomorphic expression for the psychical aspect of the universe, which if it is, could be stated in a much simpler way than the followers of Professor Green state it.

In Mr. Ritchie's hands, however, the idea of "Self" serves a good purpose. It bridges over the chasm between elemental feelings (*origin*) and the present, developed state of human self-consciousness, which now exhibits itself as a fact whose *validity* must be analysed. It is only from the latter, elevated point of view that knowledge is possible, and that the universe can be judged; that is, from the point of view of the thing as it is or can be, not as it was. Thus, also, are we led to ethics and its related sciences. For this eternal, independent Self, as it is never completely realised in any one of us, always remains the ideal which perpetually urges us onward.

These distinctions of the formal and historical character of ideas and institutions are well worked out in the succeeding essays, as practically applied to the notions of the state and society. In conformity with the fundamental distinction of his work, Mr. Ritchie calls his philosophy "idealist evolutionism."

The essays are written in excellent style, and though they are more like chats on philosophical subjects, which make us cherish the hope of a subsequent, more systematic treatment, they yet constitute a real and interesting elucidation of the theory of idealistic monism. Mr. Ritchie need have no fear about the "infliction" of his "big treatise" on the public. μκρκ.

DIE TROJABURGEN NORDEUROPA'S. Ihr Zusammenhang mit der indogermanischen Trojasage von der entführten und gefangenen Sonnenfrau (Syrith, Brunhild, Ariadne, Helena), den Trojaspielen, Schwert- und Labyrinthtänzen. Zur Feier ihrer Lenzbefreiung. Nebst einem Vorwort über den deutschen Gelehrtehdünkel. By Dr. Ernst Krause (*Carus Sterne*). Glogau: Carl Flemming. 1893. Pp. 300.

In *The Monist* for July, 1891, a review appeared of the predecessor of this work, which was entitled *Tuiskoland*. In this book Dr. Krause sought to prove that the legend of Troy originated in an old Indo-Germanic race-saga, which was best and most faithfully preserved in its northern forms, and not in its perverted but more famous classical versions. The theories of the author met with much opposi-